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Abstract In recent years, two distinct trajectories of
bioethical inquiry have emerged: neuroethics and nano-
ethics. The former deals with issues in neuroscience,
whereas the latter deals with issues in nanoscience and
nanotechnology. In both cases, the ethical inquiries have
coalesced in response to rapidly increasing scientific
and engineering developments in each field. Both also
present major issues for contemplation in bioethics.
However, the questions are (1) how different are the
ethical issues raised, and (2) is it beneficial for neuro-
ethics and nanoethics inquiries to proceed on often-
divergent trajectories by ethicists who otherwise might
never interact? If, for example, ethical inquiry occurs
only within the disciplinary confines of their predom-
inant area(s) of science (which now seems to be the
case) or by overlooking prior discussions in other
scientific realms (like genetics), then the opportunity
for a richer, more comprehensive discourse may be lost.
I argue that this (1) is a disservice to bioethics, (2) is
antithetical to some of the aims of bioethical inquiry,
and (3) encourages the reductionism bioethicists’ claim
that is counterproductive.
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In recent years, two distinct trajectories of bioethical
inquiry have emerged: neuroethics and nanoethics. The
former deals with issues in neuroscience (the study of
the brain and the nervous system) while the latter deals
with issues in nanoscience and nanotechnology (an
applied science focused on the design, synthesis,
characterization, and application of materials and
devices on a sub-atomic scale). In both cases, the
ethical inquiries have coalesced in response to rapidly
increasing scientific and engineering developments in
each field. Both also present major issues for contem-
plation in bioethics. Moreover, the ethical issues each
raises have been pursued largely independently of one
another, which suggests that these issues in each case
are somehow categorically unique to each context.
This independent consideration could be justified only
if, in fact, this were the case, and that nothing would be
gained by ethicists interacting with those addressing
ethical issues from each context. This article attempts
to address the validity of this approach by examining
what is meant by “neuroethics” and “nanoethics,” what
sorts of applications in each of the principal scientific
domains raise ethical concerns, what is driving the
subdivision of these ethical inquiries, and the con-
sequences of separating the inquiries.
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What is “Neuroethics” and Why the Recent
Interest?
Very generally speaking, neuroethics is the study of
ethical issues associated with the brain, and/or
neuroscience and neurotechnology. However, this
definition can be further refined. Walter Glannon
defines neuroethics as a
branch of bioethics concerned with the ethical
issues arising from different measures of and
interventions in the brain or central nervous
system. It lies at the intersection of the empirical
brain sciences, normative ethics, philosophy of
mind, law, and the social sciences ([18], p. 4).
Likewise, Michael Gazzaniga describes neuro-
ethics in a richer way, as being “more than just
bioethics for the brain” – for him it is
the examination of how we want to deal with the
social issues of disease, normality, mortality,
lifestyle, and the philosophy of living informed by
our understanding of underlying brain mecha-
nisms (emphasis in the original; [16], xv).
Gazzaniga’s definition is a broad one that takes
into account our knowledge of brain function in
identifying and addressing the ethical and social
issues arising from our study and potential manipu-
lation thereof.
There is some debate about when neuroethics arose
as a separate area of ethical reflection. Certainly,
ethical questions have arisen from neuroscience, in
both clinical and research contexts, over the course of
many years. However, Illes ties the launch of neuro-
ethics as a discipline to a Dana Foundation conference
held in May 2002 ([19], 1739). The conference was
one of the first that brought together neuroscientists,
lawyers, bio- and medical ethicists, and policy-makers
to discuss various aspects and implications of advances
in neuroscience.
Since that time, an ever increasing number of
articles has been written about many different topics
that fall under the general topic of “neuroethics.” As
neuroscientists make more progress in their under-
standing of how the brain functions, no doubt the
ethical implications of that understanding will contin-
ue to develop, as will the array of issues and
applications for which ethical implications are
identified.
Neuroethics: Some of the Issues
There are many different categories of issues that
arise from our increasing understanding of brain
mechanisms. Among the most often discussed issues
is the use of functional neuroimaging. For instance,
fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) has
been used in a number of research settings to study
“the neural correlates of a range of physical and
mental health conditions, behaviors, preferences, and
characteristics” ([45], p. 1). fMRI has been used in
studying everything from consumers’ preferences for
one brand of soda over another (e.g., [27]), to altruism
(e.g., [43]) and social cooperation (e.g., [11, 13]), to
the detection of the intention to lie (e.g., [1]). In none
of these cases is the use of fMRI currently scientifi-
cally robust enough for ethical use outside a research
setting. Another set of issues identified within neuro-
ethics concerns neuroenhancement. These issues
generally involve psychopharmaceuticals; i.e., the
use of anti-depressants particularly in non-depressed
people, the use of stimulants like Ritalin or modafinil
in people who suffer from neither attention deficit
disorder nor narcolepsy, and the use of beta blockers
(e.g., propranalol) for post-traumatic stress disorder
sufferers, to interfere with the brain’s ability to
imprint the emotional valence associated with the
memories of traumatic events.
What is “Nanoethics” and Why the Recent
Interest?
Nanoethics addresses the ethical, social, and policy
issues associated with developments and applications
in nanoscience and nanotechnology. Like so many
other areas of science and ethics, there are no
consensus definitions for “nanoscience” and “nano-
technology.” In very general terms, however, nano-
science “is the study of phenomena and manipulation
of materials at the atomic, molecular, and macromo-
lecular scales, where properties differ significantly
from those at a larger scale” (emphasis added) [28].
According to the National Nanotechnology Initiative,
nanotechnology is
the understanding and control of matter at
dimensions of roughly 1 to 100 nanometers,
where unique phenomena enable novel applica-
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tions. Encompassing nanoscale science, engineer-
ing and technology, nanotechnology involves
imaging, measuring, modeling, and manipulating
matter at this length scale. At the nanoscale, the
physical, chemical, and biological properties of
materials differ in fundamental and valuable ways
from the properties of individual atoms and
molecules or bulk matter. Nanotechnology R&D
is directed toward understanding and creating
improved materials, devices, and systems that
could use these new properties ([34], p. 4).
To get a brief appreciation of the size of things in the
nanoscale, consider the following. A “nanometer” (nm)
equals one billionth of a meter. It takes ten atoms of
hydrogen side-by-side to equal one nanometer. A DNA
molecule is about 2.5-nm wide. A red blood cell is vast
in comparison: about 5,000–8,000 nm in diameter. One
human hair is approximately 80,000-nm thick, and the
head of a pin is approximately 2 million nanometers
wide. Everything on the nano-scale is invisible to the
unaided eye and even to all but the most powerful
microscopes, such as the scanning tunneling micro-
scope and the atomic force microscope.
Nanotechnology encompasses many different types
of materials and applications. However, it does not
refer to any specific materials or applications. “Nano”
(whether science or technology) refers only to the
scale of the object. This contrasts with “neuroscience”
which refers specifically to the brain and nervous
system, or “bioscience” which relates to biological
systems.
Nanotechnology is a relatively young field of
endeavor, getting its conceptual start with a speech
in December 1959 by Richard Feynman. In that
speech, called “There’s Plenty of Room at the
Bottom,” Feynman discussed “the problem of manipu-
lating and controlling things on a small scale” [14].
Indeed, Feynman offered a prize of $1,000 during the
speech to the first person who could take the text on a
page of a book and shrink it to 1/25,000 of its original
size, so that it could be read with an electron
microscope. The prize was not awarded until 1985.
Progress in nanoscience and nanotechnology has
accelerated markedly since that time. For instance,
there are already 580 consumer products using
nanotechnology [30] having more than doubled in
number in the previous 18 months. While use in
consumer products is gaining ground, this is far from
the only (or even, arguably, the most lucrative)
context within which nanotechnologies have potential
application. There are also commercial applications,
which are projected to be worth around $2.6 trillion
by 2014 [26].
The remainder of this discussion will consider
nanoscience and nanotechnology within the medical
research and clinical contexts. This facilitates com-
parisons and contrasts in areas relevant to bioethics.
Within the specific area of nanomedicine, several
categories of application are foreseen, such as diag-
nostics, drug delivery, and tissue engineering. As de-
scribed in a recent report,
[i]f scientists domesticate atoms and molecules,
they could harness them for a wide range of
medical purposes. For one thing, they could
create novel nanostructures that serve as new
kinds of drugs for treating common conditions
such as cancer, Parkinson’s and cardiovascular
disease. They could also engineer nanomaterials
for use as artificial tissues that would replace
diseased kidneys and livers, and even repair
nerve damage. Moreover, they could integrate
nanodevices with the nervous system to create
implants that restore vision and hearing and
build prosthetic limbs that better serve the
disabled. When you consider that one-third of
all Americans are Baby Boomers – and that
many others already suffer from degenerative
disease – it is clear that advances in nano-
medicine could help vast numbers of people
maintain their health, their independence and
their participation in society ([42], p. 29).
Clearly, there are many optimistic predictions about
the positive impact of nanotechnology for applications
within medicine. Indeed, scientists have already begun
to make substantial progress with nanotechnology in
the area of targeted drug delivery (e.g., [9, 10, 41]),
although practical human applications are still several
years away. And while these applications sound
remarkable, they are not uncontroversial.
Relationship Between Nanotechnology
and Neuroscience
There are several areas in which nanotechnology and
neuroscience overlap. Some have pointed to the areas
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of overlap as reason to resist separating ethical
inquiries pertaining to either of the two areas. Others,
however, point to the areas where there is no overlap
to stress each area’s uniqueness, and why the ethical
issues arising from each should be treated separately.
In either case, it is important to understand the nature
of the relationship between the two disciplines to
intelligently discuss the ethical issues arising from
each, and whether there is anything to be gained by
separating the discussions.
Figure 1 depicts, in very rough terms, some of the
overlaps between nanotechnology and other sciences.
As you will notice, there are many different sciences
that overlap with nanotechnology. The reason for that
is simple: as stated above, nanotechnology refers only
to scale, and not specifically to any scientific/
technological domain.
Also note that this diagram is vastly oversimpli-
fied. Its intent is to convey that nanotechnologies are
applicable in many different sciences, any or all of
which will engender ethical quandaries at some point.
It is also worth noting that the areas of science, them-
selves, overlap with each other.1 Particularly note the
overlaps between neuroscience, genetics, and infor-
mation sciences. In combination with nanotechnolo-
gy, these domains comprise the area of converging
technologies dubbed by a US National Science
Foundation report as “NBIC” technologies; i.e., nano-
bio-info-cogno [40]. NBIC technologies will integrate
atoms, genes, data bits, and neurons. And just as the
sciences intersect and overlap, so too will many of the
ethical issues. This will be useful to bear in mind in
the discussion that follows.
Why the Move to Subdivide Ethics?
There are many possible reasons why there have been
separate ethical inquiries into issues that arise in
neuroscience and nanotechnology. These can be
reduced to two:
1. Arguably it is more effective to address the
ethical issues in the specific contexts within
which they occur. For instance, there are many
types of ethical issues that arise within nanotech-
nology that will not arise within the neuro-
sciences, e.g., issues of environmental impact,
issues inherent to the nature of nanoscience,
endeavors to create new types of materials and
devices by manipulating individual atoms and
molecules, and the potential positive and negative
economic impact nanotechnologies are predicted
to have. Similarly, there are issues within the
neurosciences that will not be relevant for
nanotechnology – for instance, the ways in which
fMRI images are interpreted and used (practically
and methodologically).
2. It can also be argued that what is driving the
separation of nano- and neuroethics is the fact that
funding agencies (e.g., US federal agencies) are
1 The diagram does not intend to imply that non-adjacent
sciences depicted above do not necessarily overlap or have
common applications. This is merely a limitation of the two-
dimensional space of the page.
Fig. 1 Relationship
between Nanotechnology
and other sciences
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providing significant dollars for the contemplation
of these issues within the context of a specific
science or technology, such as nanotechnology or
genetics. Pursuing sub-divided ethics, then, is a
matter of pragmatism. After all, it makes sense in
the academic environment, which generally
rewards grant acquisitions, for researchers who
examine ethical issues to apply their skills to the
questions that agencies are generously funding.
Certainly the more plausible, if slightly cynical, of
these possible reasons for separating nano- and
neuroethics is provided by the second explanation.
Funding amounts for at least two areas of “sub-
divided” ethics support this claim: from genetics
(genethics) and nanotechnology (nanoethics).
The mapping of the human genome became a
formalized program in 1990 (although funding began
in 1988), and ran through 2003. A total of $3.7 billion
was spent on all the activities associated with the
Human Genome Project (HGP), split between the US
Department of Energy (DOE) and the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). During the project, DOE
set aside 3% of its annual HGP budget and NIH set
aside 5% of its budget to study the project’s ethical,
legal, and social issues (ELSI) [17]. This amounts to a
total of approximately $166.62 million dollars over
13 years to study ELSI issues – i.e., genethics was
funded to the tune of nearly $13 million/year for
13 years.3 Moreover, the 5% funding for ELSI issues
has continued from the National Human Genome
Research Institute (NHGRI) since the HGP officially
ended. For instance, in 2004, NIH and DOE provided
funding to launch four “Centers of Excellence” for
ELSI research, and will have spent nearly $20 million
over the five year funding period [31], or approxi-
mately $4 million year. Total funding for NHGRI
ELSI activities has totaled $56 million from 2004–
2006 [6]. Between 1990–2003, approximately 420
ELSI grants were awarded by the NHGRI, with
around 130 from 2004–2007 [32].
The other major science and technology project
that is currently underway in the US is the National
Nanotechnology Initiative (mentioned above). This
effort includes 26 federal agencies, 13 of which have
nanotechnology research and development budgets.
The agencies comprising the NNI provide much of
the funding that is made available through grants to
the academic community. By far, the National Science
Foundation (NSF) provides the greatest share of
dollars for grants on nanotechnology’s societal
dimensions.4 Funding has been tracked for nanotech-
nology spending since 2001, and specifically for
ethical, legal, and other societal issues (ELoSI), since
2005. Since Education initiatives are also included in
the funding numbers for the ELoSI area, these
numbers overstate how much is actually going to
ELoSI research vis-a-vis nanotechnology. With that
caveat stated, the numbers for nanotechnology ELoSI
spending have been fairly constant for the last few
years, while funding for the environmental, health,
and safety issues has increased, particularly in the
request for 2008 funding. Funding for education and
ELoSI was $33.3 million in 2005, $34.1 million in
2006, $38 million in 2007 (estimated; [33], p. 39].
This represents approximately 2.6% of the annual
NNI budget. Table 1 presents these numbers, along
with the total spending for the NII for each year.
So, clearly, for humanities and social science
scholars (i.e., those most likely to be doing ethics
research), the Human Genome Project and the
National Nanotechnology Initiative have proven to
be lucrative lines of inquiry. Again, I acknowledge
that this is a somewhat cynical view, and that it is not
possible to know how much of this research would
have occurred were it not for the funding. Indeed, at
universities that are considered “research institutions,”
it would be difficult if not impossible to get tenure or
advance an academic career without successfully
competing for grants and publishing articles or books.
So, to the extent that an academic’s research interests
are flexible, these funding sources for ELSI/ELoSI
research have been a boon.
In neuroethics, the pattern is a bit different. There
are no national/international coordinated initiatives to
4 Monies are provided under the broad category of “societal
dimensions”, which includes funding for the examination of
environmental, health, and safety issues (which are tracked as a
class of funding within the societal dimensions category), and
for education and ethical, legal, and other societal issues.
3 According to a communication from the ELSI staff of NHGRI
[6], the NIH funding for ELSI projects from 1990–2003 may
have been closer to $121 million, for a total of $150 million
(including DOE funding). Whichever figure is correct, the
amount of money made available for HGP ELSI research has
been and continues to be significant.
2 The ELSI budget numbers were calculated from total funding
figures provided at: http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/
Human_Genome/project/budget.shtml.
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map the “brainome,” although there has been
increased interest in issues of neuroscience and
neurotechnologies in the last several years. For
instance, in 2004, the NIH launched the “Blueprint
for Neuroscience Research,” a collaborative effort
between 16 NIH Institutes, Centers or offices [3]. The
Blueprint’s aim is to
develop research tools, create research resources
shared by the entire neuroscience community,
train a new generation of cross-disciplinary
neuroscientists, and importantly, to develop a
cooperative framework for the institutes and
centers to plan and implement their neuroscience
research efforts (ibid. p. 10329).
The Blueprint activities are funded from the
general appropriations the centers and institutes
receive, but account for only a small proportion of
the overall funding for neuroscience. Indeed, accord-
ing to Baughman, et al., the total funding for
neuroscience research at the National Institutes of
Health is approximately $4.167 billion.5
Unlike the Human Genome Research Project and
the NNI, however, there is not an explicit dedicated
percentage of money in the US that funds research
into the ethical, legal, and social implications of either
neuroscience research, the application of neuroscience
tools, or interventions in the brain and central nervous
system. However, several of the NIH institutes that
cover the neurosciences do participate in the smaller
multi-institute grant programs that provide funding
for ELSI type issues. For instance, one call for
proposals, “Research On Ethical Issues In Human
Subjects Research” (PA-07-277) includes as potential
grantors 17 NIH institutes or offices, including ten
institutes that are also members of the NIH Blueprint
for Neuroscience Research.
The major concerted effort being made to fund
initiatives specifically in neuroethics is occurring in
Canada. In its 2007 strategic plan, the Institute of
Neurosciences, Mental Health andAddiction (INMHA)
within the Canadian Institute for Health Research
(CIHR) states it “targeted neuroethics as a novel niche
area for Canadian experts” ([22], p. 23). The plan
makes clear that officials at CIHR-INMHA have made
a concerted effort in the area of neuroethics:
CIHR-INMHA organized an expert workshop on
the topic in 2002 in Toronto and two cycles of
RFAs [Requests for Proposals] were launched,
with one team funded in each competition.
CIHR-INMHA also created a Chair in Neuro-
ethics whose first titular will be announced in
spring 2007. Support by CIHR-INMHA is
critical in this highly innovative area since other
sources of funding are scarce. CIHR-INMHA is
also leading an international group of research
funders from Asia, Europe and North America.
We plan to provide funding to expert teams in
this area as CIHR-INMHA and Canada are now
seen as the world leaders in Neuroethics (ibid.).
The RFAs (i.e., grant proposal solicitations) that are
referred to in the statement above were both awarded to
Dalhousie University, to two different teams of research-
ers [35]. Each grant was for $1.5 million (CAD) for a
five-year period. With the addition of the Chair in
neuroethics, CIHR–INMHAwill have allocated over $4
million to supporting research in neuroethics. While
this may not seem like a lot of money, at least
compared to funding for ELSI issues in nanotechnology
or in genetics, this sum represents one of the largest
governmental investments in neuroethics in the world
(inferred from chart on p. 981 in [20]). One other recent
funding initiative is also worth mentioning. In late April
2007, a call for proposals for neuroethics projects was
issued through a joint effort from Germany, Canada,
and Finland. Funding is for approximately $1.3 million
(USD), over a three year period from the Canadian and
Finnish funding agencies [5, 44].
While the existence of multi-millions of dollars of
federal funding (and some private foundation funding,
such as from the Dana Foundation) does not provide
proof in and of itself of the increased research activity in
ELSI issues in genetics and in nanotechnology, it is clear
5 Note that this number was calculated by this author based on
the numbers provided in the Baughman, et al. article (p. 10329).
Table 1. Funding for Nanotechnology Education and ELoSI
Initiatives & Total NNI Funding
Year Funding NNI total
2005 $33.3 million $1,200.0 million
2006 $34.1 million $1,351.2 million
2007 $38.0 million (requested) $1,392.1 million
2008 $38.9 million (proposed) $1,444.8 million
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that researchers have been applying for and receiving
funding in these areas for several years. Moreover, in
both the case of the Human Genome Project and the
National Nanotechnology Initiative, Congress (either at
the outset or shortly after the beginning of each project)
mandated that a part of the federal budgets for each
program be set aside for studying the ethical, legal, and
social implications of the respective projects (see e.g.,
[8], p. 335; [37], Sec. 2(b)(10)), meaning that both the
overarching projects and the study of ELSI issues were
seen as national priorities, with a relatively steady
funding stream. Again, in the US, this has not been the
case with the study of various aspects of the neuro-
sciences, including neuroethics.
Who is Addressing the Issues?
There is another factor that encourages separate
ethical inquiries into nanotechnology and neurotech-
nology; academics and other researchers engaging the
ethical issues seem to be coming from at least two
different perspectives on ethics. Those who pursue
nanoethics tend to come from backgrounds in
engineering, hard sciences, Science and Technology
Studies, and/or the social sciences (political science,
sociology, anthropology, economics), while those
who pursue neuroethics tend to come more from the
humanities, the neurosciences, and medicine.
To find evidence of this, I performed a search on
grants awarded by the National Science Foundation6
for ELoSI issues in nanotechnology. I focused the
search on grants awarded specifically from the
Directorate for Social, Behavioral, and Economic
Sciences, since most ELoSI type grants would be
funded through that directorate. The search string for
awards I used was “ethics OR ethical OR social OR
societal OR society”, and the program search term
was “nano*”. This search resulted in 22 grants
between July 2002 and September 2006 and totaled
approximately $15 million. There are 21 separate
Principal Investigators (PIs) represented in these 22
grants. Of these 21 PIs, fully 19 came from back-
grounds in engineering, science and technology
studies, chemistry, physics, economics, anthropology,
or sociology. The remaining two PIs were philoso-
phers who focused on either philosophy of chemistry
or on philosophy and agricultural economics. The two
remaining PIs of the original 21 were the only ones
who had published extensively in the bioethics realm.
They are both academic attorneys.
I then further narrowed the original search parame-
ters to omit “social, society, and societal” as search
terms. Searching for only “ethics OR ethical” elicited
9 grants (a subset of the original 22 grants), totaling
approximately $4.4 million. All of these grants were
awarded to either social scientists, engineers, or
philosophers who focus on chemistry or agricultural
economics. These statistics are understandable given
that it is scholars from the above types of disciplines
who would be more likely to apply for and receive
grants from the National Science Foundation, since
NSF is the funding agency in the federal govern-
ment that predominantly provides grant opportunities
in these fields, whether related to nanotechnology or
not.
There is less of a track record to examine in
neuroethics, since there have been only two major
grants awarded, in Canada, explicitly for neuroethics.
However, both these grants were awarded to PIs whose
primary work has been in bioethics and health policy. In
the US, any grant solicitations that could conceivably
include discussions or examinations of ELSI issues in
the neurosciences are granted from the National
Institutes of Health. The scholars and scientists who
tend to apply for these grants are much more oriented
toward biomedical fields (as are NIH’s institutes and
centers). That said, NIH is part of the National
Nanotechnology Initiative, although its focus is partic-
ularly on research that relates to nanotechnology
applications in medicine. It is mostly in this context
that a very small handful of bioethics researchers have
delved into any issues related to nanotechnology. This
is not especially surprising, given that most of the
applications of nanotechnology go beyond the usual
scope of issues that those in bioethics normally address
(e.g., dealing with the properties of materials).
So, it seems that as research into “nanoethics” and
“neuroethics” has proceeded, “never the twain shall
meet.” What is the problem with this state of affairs? It
may mean that the result of ethical inquiries into each
area will not easily transfer or be shared across dis-
ciplinary boundaries. The scholars addressing each set
of ethical issuesmay publish in broadly philosophically-6 Search engine located at http://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/.
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oriented journals (as an example), but they are much
more likely to publish articles in journals geared to
either nanotechnology OR neuroscience/bioethics/
health policy. In addition, there are new journals for
each sub-field of ethics. For instance, Springer
Netherlands recently started a journal called Nano-
ethics and has just started the journal in which this
article appears, Neuroethics. In the neuroethics field,
there is also The American Journal of Bioethics –
Neuroscience which began publishing in early 2007.
So, now it seems that the venues for publication in
these fields may well reinforce that separation. Given
this prospect, it is appropriate to next examine the
types of ethical issues that may arise in nanotechnol-
ogy and neuroscience, to see what the potential
consequences of separation might be.
What are the Ethical Issues and How Do They
Arise?
First, how different are the ethical issues raised by
nanotechnology and neuroscience (the two of interest
here)? Second, is it beneficial for inquiries into these
issues to proceed on different trajectories (which
seems to be the case now)?
At the most basic level, there are two categories of
concerns that arise from nearly all scientific and
technological endeavors: (1) those relating to more
technological aspects of engineering (i.e., what
technologies enable us to do), and (2) those based
more on philosophical questions about the human
condition and about the aims of science.
These two types of questions are, in many ways,
inseparable – and I do not intend to imply otherwise.
However, I have separated them to illustrate that
ethical questions can arise from broad questions about
the human species, and from specific questions about
the implications of a particular technological applica-
tion. This distinction will be important to bear in mind
as we directly address how to overcome the quandary
of myopic or subdivided ethics.
Some examples of very broad questions that one
might ask under the category of “what technologies
enable” could be:
1. Does the science/technology application pose
physical or environmental harms? If so, can we
mitigate them and how?
2. Does the science/technology application pose
potential physical or psychological harms to
people? If so, can we mitigate them? If so, how?
3. Are there potential collateral uses (beneficial and
harmful) of the science/technology that need to be
recognized and addressed up front?
4. How might a particular neural device implanted in
a patient’s brain effect their cortical functioning?
Assuming the device is found to be sufficiently
safe to implant, how do we design an informed
consent process that identifies the risks involved?
Among the broad philosophical questions that can
be asked, we have:
1. What is the aim of the science/technology
research/application?
– How will the science/technology being developed/
applied address that aim?
– Are the resources being spent on the specific aim
the best or most appropriate use of those resources?
2. What is our understanding of what it means to be
human?
– How do we view the “proper” role of science
and technology in shaping or defining who and
what we are as a species? As a society? As
individuals?
– What does it mean for our “humanness” if we
incorporate technologies into our bodies?
3. What impact will the technologies have on our rela-
tionship to our environment (broadly construed)?
4. How will new technologies affect society’s “haves”
vs “have nots” (will the divide become larger or
different in significant ways?) (i.e., distributive
justice issues).
Let us now move to discuss the more specific ethical
issues that have been or are being addressed within
nanotechnology and neuroscience. There are actually
many issues that are being addressed by, or are relevant
to, both nanotechnology and neuroscience applications,
and in similar contexts. For instance, human enhance-
ment is an issue that is of concern in both realms. In
discussions of nanotechnology (and specifically, nano-
medicine), longevity is a major issue – nanotechnolo-
gies could be applied to human cells (including bone
cells) to either prevent them from aging, breaking down
or otherwise to augment the cellular structure. In the
62 Neuroethics (2008) 1:55–68
neurosciences, human enhancement discussions revolve
around cognitive enhancement (e.g., through neural
prostheses, or, more commonly at present, through
psychopharmaceuticals) or sensory enhancement. In
both nano and neuro contexts, enhancement implies
augmentation of existing (and likely properly function-
ing) capacities, versus restoring abilities that may have
been lost. For the moment, less controversy surrounds
the use of technologies to restore lost abilities.
A second common theme in nanotechnology appli-
cations and neuroscience advances concerns surveil-
lance and privacy. In the case of nanotechnology, the
possibility of microscopic sensors that can read/transmit
data about people (their movements, their bodily
functions, their location, etc.) is a major area of concern.
For neuroscience applications, concerns are particularly
acute in discussions of functional neuroimaging and the
application/misapplication of information inferred from
the images. Among the most controversial potential
applications is the use of functional neuroimaging to
“detect” when someone is lying. Indeed, there are
already two private companies in the US7 that are
selling their functional neuroimaging technologies and
access to proprietary software for lie detection pur-
poses. What makes these applications controversial is
that images from functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging (fMRI; upon which the lie detection applica-
tions are based) depicts “metabolic correlates of neural
activity, not the activity itself. Images are constructed
based on blood-oxygenation-level dependent (BOLD)
contrast” ([21], p. 156). Most troubling, however, is the
fact that there is little reason to think that the neural
activity itself (given our current understanding – or
lack thereof) can be reliably interpreted as indicative of
deception. So, conclusions are being drawn on the
basis of interpreting blood oxygenation levels in the
brain (which are not necessarily consistent from person
to person) and taken to mean that a person is lying – a
potentially spurious conclusion. Moreover, the fact that
there are now commercial applications for these and
some nanotechnology applications raises other com-
mon issues of safety, risk, and regulation. Some of
these questions will be ethical in nature while others
will be matters for legal and public policy processes.
A third common ethical issue raised in nanotech-
nology and neuroscience applications concerns the
use of these technologies for military applications.
The US military has been conducting and funding
much research in the neurosciences, particularly for
cognitive and sensory enhancement research. Some of
the controversies arising in this context concern ap-
plications that may enhance a warfighter’s (the term
used by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency [DAPRA] for “soldier”) ability to kill, or to
minimize the psychological impact of having done so.
To the extent that nanotechnologies will play a role in
these applications, they will be implicated as well.
Possibilities of other types of human harm from
applications of nanotechnologies and of neurotechnol-
ogies will also raise ethical issues. Among the issues of
concern in nanotechnologies is the probability that they
will be able to traverse the blood-brain barrier. While
for many applications (e.g., brain tumor treatment), this
characteristic is desirable, it may also be that in other
applications, it is clearly not only undesirable, but also
fraught with risks for proper cognitive function.
Inhaling or ingesting nanostructures (e.g., carbon
nanotubes) may cause harms as they interact with
bodily tissues. For technologies associated with neuro-
science, some of the issues of possible harm arise from
implantable neural devices (such as brain-computer
interface chips), “smart drugs” (non-medical uses of
psychopharmaceuticals), or inappropriate uses of func-
tional neuroimages. Many of the harm issues (for both
nano and neuro) will also be byproducts of the other
ethical issues these technology applications raise, e.g.,
potential harms associated with the use of nano-
technologies for surveillance purposes.
Finally, for this discussion at least, there is the
perennial issue that afflicts most discussions of ethics
and technologies: that the ethics considerations lag
behind the technology developments, or that the
ethical discussions that do occur do so in a vacuum.
Some have argued that this is what happened with the
Human Genome Program’s ELSI research (see, e.g.,
[4, 12, 23, 15]), i.e., that ELSI researchers conducted
their work in isolation from either the policy process
and/or genomic scientists. That criticism was not lost
on Congress; the legislative language mandating the
contemplation of ELSI issues in nanotechnology set
out the following stipulation:
insofar as possible, integrat[e] research on so-
cietal, ethical, and environmental concerns with
nanotechnology research and development, and
7 Cephos Corporation, based in Pepperell, MA; and No Lie
MRI. In Phoenix, AZ.
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ensur[e] that advances in nanotechnology bring
about improvements in quality of life for all
Americans [P.L.108–153 2003, Sec. 2(b)(10)(C)].
The extent to which this mandate allows, encour-
ages, or even rewards relevant ethical considerations
beyond those strictly related to nanotechnology is not
clear. Certainly to date, the major US federal govern-
ment entities funding nanotechnology initiatives have
not seemed to encourage such extra-disciplinary
collaboration. For instance, a recently awarded NSF
grant for “nanoethics” provided $250,000 for a three
year project to study the ethics of human enhancement
[36]. The project’s description acknowledges that there
is an existing literature on human enhancement, but it
also makes clear that the investigators consider
nanotechnology to be the driving force for their study.
Interestingly, in a press release about the grant award,
the following were among the questions the inves-
tigators stated they will consider:
What exactly constitutes enhancement? Is there a
right to be enhanced? Is it justifiable to enhance
people in order for them to undertake certain
tasks, e.g., in the military? Is there an obligation to
enhance our children? Should there be limits on
the types of enhancement allowed or the degree to
which someone can be enhanced? Does it make
an ethical difference if some enhancing device is
implanted into the body rather than worn on the
outside? Does the notion of human dignity suffer
with such enhancements? [29]
In this list of questions, there is little to suggest why
they solely relate to nanotechnology. Indeed, as men-
tioned above, questions of human enhancement have
been considered from a philosophical perspective (within
specific contexts, but also from a more general perspec-
tive) for many years. Moreover, it must be remembered
that “nanotechnology” refers to the SIZE of the technol-
ogy, and not to a specific site or mode of application.
The intent here is not to single out any particular
grant for criticism – it is merely to indicate that the
tendency to subdivide ethical inquiries into special-
ized areas of discourse may inevitably lead to
multiple, parallel, and separate endeavors, impeding
possible cross-fertilization of ideas, and leading to the
real possibility that the fundamental underlying
philosophical issues will be viewed very differently,
depending upon the domain of discourse. Using the
example of human enhancement above, it may be that
by separately contemplating the fundamental ques-
tions specifically relevant to nanotechnologies,
enhancements will be seen as acceptable, whereas in
the context of neurotechnologies, they will not. In this
case, it may get even more confusing as nano-
technologies find more and more applications in the
“neuro” context. Indeed, it will be the case that
nanotechnologies are going to be applied in many
neuro-related applications; for instance, one applica-
tion in the conceptual stage would use nano-electrodes
(which can read and deliver electrical signals) threaded
through an artery in the groin up to the brain. These
electrodes could then be used to deliver deep brain
stimulation (DBS) for patients with Parkinson’s
Disease. Because the electrodes are only 600 nm wide,
they can get much closer to the effected neurons than
can conventional electrodes used in DBS [25, 7].
It is also the case that those researching issues in
neuroethics are, by and large, not focusing on nano-
technologies or on nanoethics. Certainly there has
been some acknowledgement that nanotechnologies
will have an impact on clinical neurosciences at some
point in the future. There have been some articles
published that, like this article, question the wisdom
of subdivided ethical inquiries [46, 38]. Other articles
question whether there is anything “new” in either
domain that warrants such separate inquiries [24, 39].
In any case, I would argue that for those in the
neurosciences or studying “neuroethics” specifically,
it is folly to not consider the role nanotechnologies
will play in clinical neurosciences. This is especially
true given the evidence that many technologies are
beginning to converge, and will continue to do so,
and at a more rapid pace, in the future. Indeed, the
NSF has already coined an acronym for these
converged technologies – NBIC (or Nano-Bio-Info-
Cogno; see, e.g., [2, 40]. Interestingly, many of the
applications of nanotechnology which generate a lot
of interest in the nanotechnology literature are those
whose primary application is within the brain, central
nervous system, or peripheral nervous system.
And, lest anyone think that the issues identified
above are only common to nanoethics and neuroethics
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inquiries, they should be assured that each of these
issues has already been raised in the context of the
genetic sciences. To a large extent, many of these
common issues have been the subject of HGP ELSI
funded research. Human enhancement and identity,
privacy, access and distributive justice issues, and the
lag between ethics and technology – all these issues
have been addressed on either the philosophical and/or
contextual levels for the genetic sciences and technol-
ogies. The question is whether any of the fruits of that
labor will be utilized as similar questions arise in
nanotechnology and neuroscience applications. Given
that many of the bioethics researchers who have
addressed ethical issues in the context of genetics are
the same oneswho are now undertaking ethical inquiries
into neurosciences and neuro-technologies, I am more
optimistic as to the prospects of the earlier work being
applied in the neuroethics domain. As stated earlier, it
does not appear as yet that the researchers who are
examining nanotechnologies’ ethical implications are
doing the same, although additional research is needed
to test the validity of this hypothesis.
Difference of Degree or Difference of Kind?
(or, is There Anything New Here?)
It is necessary at this juncture to squarely address the
question of whether there is any value in subdividing
or contextualizing domains of ethical inquiry. Others,
as mentioned above, have addressed this question by
asking whether there is anything new arising from the
technologies to warrant the separation. I will address
this question by asking whether the ethical issues
arising in the nano and neuro contexts represent a
“difference of degree” or a “difference of kind.”
Again, I turn to the distinction I made earlier about
the ways in which ethical issues arise in scientific and
technological endeavors (either through what tech-
nologies enable, or through the more fundamental
philosophical questions about the nature of man and
the aims of science). I contend that the answer to the
question of degree or kind depends on the category of
the question. For the practical (i.e., technology-
enabling) questions, there could be a point in time at
which there will be “differences in kind” – i.e., that
the capabilities that these technologies might enable
could be so radical as to constitute a different species
of question/issue. For the fundamental philosophically
based ethics questions, however, there will likely only
be a difference of degree; that is, the underlying
issues will still revolve around questions about the
nature of man, distributive justice, or the aims of
science. That said, as stated at the outset, it may not
be entirely obvious in all cases just how to character-
ize the nature of the issues, or at what point a
difference of degree becomes a difference of kind.
Clearly, determining the “starting point” will be
crucial in making that determination. Consider the
following illustration of human enhancement:
These three photographs show different states of
being (although, admittedly, photo 3 is not a direct
progression from the two others – i.e., the third is of a
different fictional character). Philosophically, the
questions that underlie the state of being portrayed
in each photo, and the progression from one to the
1 2 3
“Star Trek: The Next Generation” - photos courtesy of CBS Paramount Network Television.  RoboCop photo 
courtesy of the RoboCop Archive.
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next, are identical: what is the nature of man; what do
we mean by the concept of “human”? It does not
matter whether we start at photo 1 and jump to photo
3 – the questions are the same, and at most, represent
a difference of degree (e.g., “Is Robocop any less
human than Jean Luc Picard?”). If we look at the
photos from the perspective of the application of
technology, however, the question of whether some-
thing represents a difference of degree or of kind is
less clear. For instance, if we start at photo 1 and
jump to photo 3, the progression seems to represent a
difference in kind. However, if we start at 1 and go to
2 or start at 2 and go to 3, both these seem to
represent a difference of degree. Again, the starting
point makes the difference.8 The appropriateness of
the use of the technology for these specific applica-
tions is among the ethical questions arising from these
photos. It is also interesting to note that going
sequentially from photo 1 to 3 may elicit fewer
ethical questions (on the face of it, at any rate), than
the jump from photo 1 to photo 3. In other words, the
more incremental the technological changes seem to
be, the fewer ethical issues will likely be raised along
the way. This does not mean, however, that this is
necessarily the appropriate lens through which to
view these changes.
So, bringing this back to the current discussion –
emphasizing the point that ethicists addressing neuro-
applications need to be looking at nanotechnologies – the
increasing integration of nanotechnologies into neuro-
applications will likely yield issues differing in degree
(partly due to the “starting point” issue). Examples of the
issues that would be relevant include,
– The adequacy of how we address risk;
– The protection of human subjects in research;
– The regulation of medical devices;
– Social benefits and harms of the emerging
technologies;
– The impact of the technologies on the practice of
clinical medicine; and
– The additional expertise required of medical
personnel to use nano-enabled technologies.
However, there may also come a point at which the
outcome resulting from these incrementally addressed
issues will be something so different from what was
originally contemplated as to become an utterly new
species of issue.
Lessons to be Learned
There is no question that the relevant technological
artifacts are becoming increasingly sophisticated, that
they are shrinking in size while increasing in
capabilities, and are converging across modalities
(e.g., NBIC technologies). Since nanotechnologies
could be applied to many different scientific and
clinical endeavors, there is also little question that
nanotechnologies will have a greater impact on
clinical neuroscience than neuroscience will have on
nanotechnology. As such, two things become clear: as
mentioned above, those focusing on neuroethics
cannot afford to ignore the impact (technologically
and ethically) nanotechnology will have on neurosci-
ence and brain function; and those focusing more on
nanoethics should heed the underlying philosophical
debates that have been occurring for decades in other
domains of ethical inquiry. Otherwise, we risk
constantly “reinventing the same wheel” over and
over again, with little opportunity to learn from the
rich and diverse literature produced from past inqui-
ries into similar issues/questions. Not only is this a
waste of intellectual capital, it is also likely a waste of
the taxpayer dollars being spent on grants pursuing
what may well be duplicative ethical inquiries.
We need to resist the temptation to categorize all
ethical questions by domains of inquiry. Bioethicists
claim to reject reductionist perspectives, and yet have
been caught up in it in the genetic and now, neuro
contexts. It appears that researchers addressing ethical
issues in nanotechnologies are doing the same.
(Again, more research is needed to address this
supposition.) By focusing on reductionist or alterna-
tively, myopic approaches to ethical implications of
technologies, we miss the opportunity to learn from
other contexts in which the issues have been
addressed, already taking into account the more
deeply rooted philosophical questions. Indeed there
is already convergence in the issues now – a trend that
will intensify into the future.
8 Another example might be the progression of the biplane to
the space shuttle, as examples of transportation technologies.
Viewed as endpoints, the technologies of the biplane and the
shuttle represent a difference of kind. Viewed incrementally, the
technologies may represent merely a difference of degree from
one to the next.
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I would contend that researchers focused on either
nanoethics or neuroethics (or other subdivided ethics)
should resist the temptation that the funding agencies
perpetuate – i.e. to look myopically at all of the
ethics issues within their own particular context,
and instead focus on collaborative opportunities for
addressing at least the underlying philosophical
questions that are relevant to ALL scientific/techno-
logical endeavors. Of course, this also means that
funding agencies should provide funding mechanisms
that encourage (or indeed, mandate) these sorts of
collaborative opportunities across contextual settings
where otherwise there would be no natural collabo-
rations. By this discussion, I do not intend to imply that
there is no place for contemplating any ethical issues
through the domain of technology application. For the
ethical questions of a technological nature, an under-
standing of the specific technologies and applications
will be invaluable.
I end with what I call the elephant metaphor of
myopic ethics. There is an old Indian (or Jain) parable
in which six blind men come across an elephant.
None had ever “experienced” an elephant before.
They moved close to it so they can feel it and describe
what they felt, each at a different part of the ele-
phant’s body. The man by the elephant’s leg described
it as a pillar, the man near the ear described it as a fan,
the torso was described as a wall, the tail as a rope,
etc. Each man experienced only a part of the elephant,
but each insisted he was correct in describing the
whole elephant. The problem, of course, was that
none of the blind men could “see” the entire elephant,
and thus could not comprehend what the elephant
really was.
We run the same sort of risk with the overlapping
ethical issues that arise in the contexts of nanotechnol-
ogy and the neurosciences/neurotechnologies, and
other scientific and technological domains in which
ethical issues arise. There is much to gain from the
expertise and insights ethics researchers have acquired
in their own domains of inquiry. We now need to be
wise enough to learn how to share this intellectual
wealth, and encourage researchers to do so.
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